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Abstract
Background: Corruption pervades educational and other institutions worldwide and medical schools are not
exempt. Empirical evidence about levels and types of corruption in medical schools is sparse. We conducted
surveys in 2000 and 2007 in the medical school of the Autonomous University of Guerrero in Mexico to document
student perceptions and experience of corruption and to support the medical school to take actions to tackle
corruption.
Methods: In both 2000 and 2007 medical students completed a self-administered questionnaire in the classroom
without the teacher present. The questionnaire asked about unofficial payments for admission to medical school,
for passing an examination and for administrative procedures. We examined factors related to the experience of
corruption in multivariate analysis. Focus groups of students discussed the quantitative findings.
Results: In 2000, 6% of 725 responding students had paid unofficially to obtain entry into the medical school; this
proportion fell to 1.6% of the 436 respondents in 2007. In 2000, 15% of students reported having paid a bribe to
pass an examination, not significantly different from the 18% who reported this in 2007. In 2007, students were
significantly more likely to have bribed a teacher to pass an examination if they were in the fourth year, if they
had been subjected to sexual harassment or political pressure, and if they had been in the university for five years
or more. Students resented the need to make unofficial payments and suggested tackling the problem by
disciplining corrupt teachers. The university administration made several changes to the system of admissions and
examinations in the medical school, based on the findings of the 2000 survey.
Conclusion: The fall in the rate of bribery to enter the medical school was probably the result of the new
admissions system instituted after the first survey. Further actions will be necessary to tackle the continuing
presence of bribery to pass examinations and for administrative procedures. The social audit helped to draw
attention to corruption and to stimulate actions to tackle it.
Background
Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon pervading many
types of institutions, including those in the education
sector. Education is conceivably the most important sec-
tor for launching efforts to prevent corruption [1]. In
higher education, increased competition among students
has led to new opportunities for corrupt practices [2].
Rumyantseva classified educational corruption by area
(academic or services), and by the people involved in the
exchange (student-faculty, student-administrator, and
student-staff) [3]. These classifications refer to bribery in
the course of delivering educational services and do not
include other types of corruption such as political and
administrative corruption or academic fraud [4].
Corruption in the education sector is not limited to
strictly academic institutions. Offers to sell grades, fake
degrees, and false accreditation and certification licenses
are increasingly promoted by individuals or companies in
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tion in higher education in Bulgaria, Moldova, Croatia
and Serbia, found various forms of corruption across dif-
ferent disciplines. Faculties of economics, law and medi-
cal sciences were the most corrupt [6]. Bribery at lower
education levels may be predictive of corrupt behaviour
at higher levels. A survey in Ukraine reported that those
who gave bribes for their final exams in secondary educa-
tion were more likely to give them for admission to the
next education level [7].
The little research done on ethical issues that might
h a v ean e g a t i v ei m p a c to nt h ep r o f e s s i o n a l i s mo ff u t u r e
physicians has tended to focus on medical student beha-
viour in general [8], examining corrupt practices only in
this context [9]. Misconduct of medical students covers a
whole range of behaviour from signing the attendance list
for an absent classmate, through to more seriously corrupt
practices like paying a bribe for passing an examination.
The strong social position of the university professor
makes it easy for him or her to influence student beha-
viour inappropriately in a variety of ways such as persuad-
ing them to vote for a particular university faction or to
submit to sexual harassment.
A Mexican newspaper recently reported the discovery by
health authorities that the text of the national examination
for a medical residency was being sold [10]. A subse-
quently published comment referred to this as a long-
standing practice [11]. During residency training for medi-
cal specialities, the young physician is offered gifts by
pharmaceutical companies [12]. This has generated
debates about the degree of influence that these ‘gifts’ have
on the physician’s impartiality when prescribing medicines
[13]. There have been calls for the establishment of norms
to regulate these gifts, and for a standard of unbiased
pharmaceutical information in the curricula of medical
schools [14]. Some programmes to diminish the effects of
the pharmaceutical representatives on medical students
are currently being developed [15].
It is plausible that doctors who behaved dishonestly as
medical students will continue such behaviour with their
patients and in their jobs [16]. Unofficial payments among
government health workers have been found to occur
mainly among medical doctors [17,18]. The linkage
between exposure to unofficial payments at the medical
schools and the occurrence of unofficial payments among
health professionals still needs further research.
Recourse to the influence of private contacts and pay-
ing for admission into medical school are a concern in at
least certain countries [19,20]. High demand for entry
into medical school opens a window for corruption. In
Slovakia, 45% of households with university students
responded that it is definitely not possible to be accepted
in medical school without giving a bribe [21]. Hrabak in
2004 reported that 0.7% of the medical students in
Zagreb paid for passing an examination [9]. In Serbia 5%
of medical students paid a teacher for passing an exam
and 27% bribed a faculty member for a grade [3]. Accord-
ing to the authors of a survey of 203 physicians in Poland
in 2001, there was a generalised belief that medical
school teachers were among the groups that benefited
most from corruption [22].
We conducted two cross-sectional surveys in the Auton-
omous University of Guerrero, the first in 1999-2000 and
the second in 2007. The main objective of the surveys was
to measure students’ perception and experience of the uni-
versity’s integrity and to propose actions to improve it.
Methods
The research was approved by the CIET Mexico ethics
committee. We obtained informed consent from all parti-
cipants, who understood they were free to refuse to parti-
cipate in the study and to refuse to answer any questions
they chose not to.
In both 2000 and 2007, the students who were present
in the classes during the day of the survey completed a
self-administered questionnaire in their classrooms, in
the presence of the researchers but without the presence
of the teacher. Both surveys covered 41 preparatory
schools and 30 university colleges, including the medical
school. The questions in the two surveys were the same
and enquired about: age and sex; years of study in the
medical school; perception of the main academic and
administrative problems in the medical school; unofficial
payments for registration (entry), to pass an examination,
or for administrative services; and suggestions about how
to deal with corruption.
Analysis
Data operators entered data twice with validation, using
Epi Info software. Analysis relied on CIETmap open
source software [23] which incorporates an interface to
the widely used public domain R software. We examined
the change in unofficial payments between 2000 and
2007 and factors related to making unofficial payments
in 2007. Bivariate and then multivariate analysis was
based on the Mantel-Haenzsel procedure [24]. Multivari-
ate analysis began with saturated models including all
variables potentially associated with the outcome, and
stepped down to final models including only variables
that remained significantly associated with the outcome.
The significance of associations is described by the
adjusted Odds Ratio (ORa) and the 95% confidence inter-
val (CI) around the ORa.
To compare reported payments in 2000 with reported
payments in 2007, we converted the figures into equiva-
lent days of work according to the average official mini-
mum wage for the geographical zone of Acapulco city:
33.33M$ in 2000 and 46.09 M$ in 2007 [25].
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the key quantitative results, mechanisms of bribes trans-
fer, priority problems in the medical school, what should
be done to reduce corruption in the school, and who
should lead the effort to achieve solutions.
We distributed the results from the 2000 survey to stu-
dents and university workers, and presented the final
report of the survey to the University Council, the highest
governing body of the university, framed in terms of the
need for institutional reforms to improve academic qual-
ity at the university.
Results
We interviewed 46% of the medical school’s student body
(725/1566) in 2000 and 44% in 2007 (436/986). The lower
number of students on the 2007 survey reflects the enrol-
ment policy, established in 2002, which decreased the
number of students admitted to the medical school. Of
the 1095 students taking classes in the academic session
(morning) of the survey in 2000, 164 were in a class out-
side the medical school, and 206 (19%) were “habitual
absentees”; all the 725 actually present completed the
questionnaire. Of 615 students taking classes in the morn-
ing session of the 2007 survey, 120 were in a class outside
the medical school, and 59 (10%) were “habitual absen-
tees”; all the 436 actually present completed the question-
naire. Some 56% (398/706) of the respondents who
indicated their sex were male in 2000 and 60% (260/430)
in 2007.
Some 8% (59/717) of medical students responding to
the 2000 survey reported corruption as the medical
school’s main academic problem (Table 1). That propor-
tion increased to 22% (94/418) in the 2007 survey: a
medical student in the 2007 survey was three times
more likely to affirm that corruption was the main pro-
blem of the faculty compared with a medical student in
the 2000 survey (OR 3.14, 95% CI 2.24–4.41). Absentee-
ism among teachers, another expression of corruption,
was rated as the main academic problem by 12% of stu-
dents in 2000 and 9% in 2007. Corruption in the
school’s administrative processes was perceived almost
equally in the two surveys; 13% in 2000 and 12% in
2007 considered it the main administrative problem.
The most common “main academic problem” cited in
2000 was excessive political discussions (58% of stu-
dents), while in 2007 it was low student performance
(32% of students).
Table 2 shows the numbers and proportions of students
who reported making unofficial payments in the two sur-
veys. The proportion of students that reported having paid
unofficially for registration in the medical school dropped
from 6% (44/712) in 2000 to 1.6% (7/436) in 2007. A stu-
dent in the medical school in 2000 was four times as likely
to report having paid unofficially for their registration into
the school compared with a student in the medical school
in 2007 (OR 4.02, 95% CI 1.9 – 8.5).
Amongst the students in all four years of the course
together, the proportion who reported paying to pass an
examination did not differ significantly between 2000
(15%) and 2007 (18%). In both 2000 and 2007, the pro-
portion of students who reported they had ever bribed a
teacher to pass an examination was higher in the later
years of the course, and was highest in the fourth (final)
year (Table 2) . The trend was significant in both 2000
and 2007 (X
2 test of trend 111.7, 3 df, p<0.0001 in 2000,
and 122.0, 3 df, p<0.0001 in 2007). The proportion who
reported paying for an administrative procedure (such as
enrolment certificate or student ID) was similar in 2000
(9%) and 2007 (8%).
In the 2007 survey, four variables were independently
associated with ever having paid a bribe to a teacher to
pass an examination (Table 3). The strongest association
was with being a fourth year student. Students who
reported having been subjected to sexual harassment or
political pressure were also more likely to have paid a
teacher to pass an examination. Those students who
had been at the university five years or more were more
likely to have paid a bribe to pass an examination.
As shown in Table 4, the average amount paid by stu-
dents who had paid unofficially for registration at the
medical school (in terms of days at the minimum wage)
was higher in the 2000 survey than in the 2007 survey,
but the difference was not significant at the 5% level (t
test 1.49, 34 df, p =0.14). On the other hand, the reported
bribe to a teacher for passing an examination increased
s i g n i f i c a n t l yb e t w e e nt h e2 0 0 0s u r v e ya n dt h e2 0 0 7s u r -
vey (t test 3.42, 148 df, p =0.0008). The average amount
paid for bribes for administrative procedures did not
change significantly between the two surveys (t test 1.09,
67df, p =0.28).
Table 1 Medical students’ perception of the main
problem in their school
2000 survey 2007 survey
Main academic problem n=717 n=418
Excessive political discussions 413 (58%) † 110 (26%) †
Absenteeism of teachers 83 (12%) 39 (9%)
Low academic level 87 (12%) 40 (10%)
Low student performance 75 (11%) † 135 (32%) †
Corruption 59 (8%) † 94 (22%) †
Main administrative problem n= 710 n= 429
Lack of equipment 399 (56%) † 168 (39%) †
Overcrowding of students 109 (15%) † 18 (4%) †
Corruption 90 (13%) 50 (12%)
Student services management 62 (9%) † 139 (32%) †
Cleanliness of the school 50 (7%) 54 (13%)
† = Difference between 2000 and 2007 significant at the 5% level
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The questionnaire asked for suggestions for how corrup-
tion in the medical school could be reduced. In 2000,
some 53% of students (377/712) said those teachers who
ask for a bribe should be dismissed from their employ-
ment. Administrative sanctions (such as salary penalties)
were suggested by 24% (174/702) of students; 14% (101/
712) wanted public disclosure of the teacher’s name; and
8% (60/712) said nothing could be done. In the 2007 sur-
vey, 44% of students (185/424) believed dismissing the tea-
cher involved was the way to stop bribes. The other
suggestions in 2007 were: administrative sanctions 31%
(130); disclosure 19% (79) and 7% (30) said nothing could
be done.
Student focus groups in 2000 considered the frequency
and types of corruption in the medical school revealed by
the survey were realistic. They noted that political harass-
ment and poor preparation of classes by teachers were
also a form of corrupt behaviour. They felt that poor pre-
paration of classes by teachers was the most important
problem and suggested this should be prioritised by the
university authorities. They felt excessive demand for
admission to the school was the main reason students
paid for their registration. They said the most common
administrative procedures for which students had to
make unofficial payments were: obtaining a student iden-
tification card and certificate of enrolment, registration
for a re-examination, and fast access to ones grades.
They said some teachers were notorious for demanding
bribes to pass examinations, even establishing ‘tariffs’ for
different examinations. Some teachers linked political
harassment and selling of grades. Bad behaviour by tea-
chers, who usually have two or three jobs in addition to
teaching in the medical school, was fostered by lack of
administrative controls and sanctions. The students were
optimistic that the medical school could improve the sys-
tem and reduce corruption and they considered students
could support this action if they simply stopped bribing.
Action by the medical school
After the results of the 2000 survey were presented to the
University Council, the Faculty of Medicine introduced
Table 2 Students who reported making unofficial payments in the medical school, by year of the four-year course
Number (%) who made an unofficial payment
2000 survey First year
(n= 367)
Second year
(n=152)
Third year
(n=98)
Fourth year
(n=95)
All years
(n=712)
For admission to the medical school 17 (5) 6 (4) 9 (9) 12 (12) 44 (6)
To pass an examination 7 (2) 32 (21) 27 (28) 37 (40) † 104 (15)
For an administrative procedure 27 (8) 9 (6) 13 (14) 14 (15) 63 (9)
2007 survey First year
(n= 145)
Second year
(n= 100)
Third year
(n=103)
Fourth year
(n=88)
All years
(n= 436)
For admission to the medical school 1 (1) 0 4 (4) 2 (2) 7 (1.6)
To pass an examination 4 (3) 1 (1) 24 (24) 47 (57) ‡ 76 (18)
For an administrative procedure 3 (2) 8 (8) 8 (8) 14 (16) 33 (8)
† = X
2 Test of trend 111.7, df 3, p<0.0001
‡ = X
2 Test of trend 122.0, df 3, p<0.0001
Table 3 Final model of variables associated with unofficial payments from medical students to teachers for passing an
examination, 2007 survey
Variable Crude Odds Ratio Adjusted Odds Ratio 95% confidence interval
Student in fourth year 14.9 9.6 5.4 – 16.9
Sexual harassment by teachers 3.6 3.2 1.4 – 7.4
Political harassment by teachers 3.6 3.2 1.6 – 6.3
Enrolled in university >5 yrs 4.7 2.6 1.4 – 4.9
The following variables were included in the initial model:
Sex of the student
Age of the student
Course year of the student
Years of enrolled in the university
Perception of corruption as main problem in the university
Perception of corruption as main academic problem in the medical school
Sexual harassment by teachers
Political harassment by teachers
Unofficial payments for an administrative procedure
Unofficial payment for admission to the medical school
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number of students, an independent evaluation for selec-
tion of new students, and collective examination of stu-
dents by department heads rather than by individual
teachers.
Discussion
Limitations
We conducted our survey during an ordinary class day at
the medical school and administered the questionnaire to
all students who were present during that morning ses-
sion. The number of students who participated in the sur-
vey was less than half the total student body in each
survey. However, most of those not included were not pre-
sent in the school at the time of the survey because they
d i dn o th a v ec l a s s e si nt h es c h o o l ,s ot h i si sn o tl i k e l yt o
h a v ei n t r o d u c e dab i a s .T h e r ew a sal o w e rp r o p o r t i o no f
“habitually absent” students in 2007 compared with 2000.
These habitual absentees may well be students who
expected to be able to complete their course by paying a
bribe to pass examinations, so their absence in the sample
may have led to an underestimate of the level of bribes,
with this being more apparent in 2000 than 2007 because
there were more of them in 2000.
We asked students if they had ever paid a bribe to pass
an examination. We did not ask when they last paid such a
bribe. The finding that a higher proportion of students in
year four (or of those who had been in the medical school
for five years or more) had paid to pass an examination
does not necessarily mean that, in a given academic year,
those students in their fourth year paid bribes for examina-
tions more than students in lower years. It could simply be
that students in their fourth year have had more opportu-
nities to pay for examinations than those in their first to
third year. It could also reflect a decreasing trend of paying
for examinations over time. However, there is reason to
believe that students have more incentive to pay for pas-
sing their fourth year examinations, which play an impor-
tant part in determining their future. Hrabak reported that
advanced students were more likely to use improper influ-
ence or to pay for passing an examination [9].
Levels of corruption
Little has been reported about unofficial payments in
medical schools and reported rates from the few
published studies [8,9] might be only the tip of the ice-
berg. We focused on unofficial payments by students.
These probably involve extortion on the part of the tea-
cher, but the mechanisms of these corruption processes
still need to be clarified.
In public universities the position of the teachers and
administrative workers is similar to that of official gov-
ernment workers; in fact they are public workers. In this
sense, the definition of corruption “the use of public posi-
tion for personal gain” [26,27] applies to teachers and
administrative workers in medical schools where corrup-
tion exists.
Considerable amounts of money may be involved in
some of these corrupt transactions in the medical school.
A c c o r d i n gt oK u m a r ,i nI n d i a ,a d m i s s i o nt om e d i c a l
school is so profitable that the transactions are patronised
by politicians who take the enrolment payments as a
source of income [20]. In Kenya the amount paid for
bribes in public universities appears to be on the rise:
those reported in 2003 were seven times higher than the
previous year [28]. In Mexico, according to a newspaper
report referred to earlier, each aspirant to a medical resi-
dency paid 80,000M$, the equivalent 1,580 days of work at
the 2007 minimum wage, for the purchase of the admis-
sion test [11]. In our 2000 study, the average payment for
admission into medical school was the equivalent to 149
days of work. We were unable to find comparable studies
from other countries to compare the occurrence of cor-
ruption in the process of admission to medical schools.
Perceptions about corruption
Our questionnaire did not ask about attitudes of the stu-
dents toward unethical conduct although this was
touched on in the focus groups. Other authors have
found students’ attitudes to be a predictor of serious dis-
honest behaviour [9]. However, particularly in transac-
tions where money is involved, the teacher shares
responsibility. Probably the greater culpability is on the
side of the teacher who, as a role model, is under greater
obligation to avoid corrupt behaviour. Corruption is said
to thrive where there is a monopoly of services, discretion
in the application of the rules and low accountability [29].
All of these conditions could exist for medical school tea-
chers. Particularly in small and medium-sized schools,
like the one in our study, a specific subject is taught by
Table 4 Average amount paid unofficially (converted to days of work at the minimum wage)
Item 2000 survey 2007 survey
n= mean SD n= mean SD p value †
For admission to the medical school 30 149 137 6 64 34.5 0.14
For passing an examination 83 8.3 9.4 67 14.6 13.1 0.0008
For an administrative request at the school 48 22.2 76.6 21 3.9 4.7 0.28
SD = standard deviation
† = p value from t test
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monopoly. The teachers determine the final grades and
there is room for discretion. Teachers are accountable
only to the head of the department or the school princi-
pal and that accountability is generally limited to their
academic performance.
Our results showed an increased perception of corrup-
tion as an academic problem in the medical school in the
second survey but without any increase in actual experi-
ence of corruption, and indeed a decrease in bribes to
secure entry into the medical school. It is known that
experiences of corruption tend to be under-reported
because some respondents are reluctant to admit making
unofficial payments [17,18]. Reluctance by students to
report misconduct has been reported by other authors
[8,9]. It is possible that students who completed the ques-
tionnaire in 2007 were more open to report (at least on
the anonymous questionnaire) that they had paid a bribe
than students in 2000, so there could in fact have been a
r e d u c t i o ni nt h ea c t u a ll e v e lo fb r i b e sf o re x a m i n a t i o n
between 2000 and 2007, masked by this reporting differ-
ence. We do not know if this is so.
Actions to tackle corruption
After the 2000 survey, the medical school implemented
an admission test, conducted by an independent body,
which all aspirants must pass in order to be admitted
into the school. This is the main mechanism of control
to avoid illegal enrolments. The proportion of students in
the 2007 survey who reported paying for registration was
indeed much lower than in the 2000 survey. The few stu-
dents in the 2007 survey who paid for registration may
have been deceived by corrupt staff members into believ-
ing they were enrolled by the influence of the staff mem-
ber (who took their payment), when in fact they were
admitted by the normal procedures. Only one first year
student in the 2007 survey reported having paid for regis-
tration. The medical school plans to strengthen its infor-
mation outreach about the official cost of the admission
procedures and to emphasize that students should not
make any other payments to obtain admission.
Collective examinations by department heads instead of
by individual teachers were introduced in the medical
school after the report of the 2000 survey was shared with
the University Council. This was intended to decrease
bribes to teachers for passing an examination. From our
data, it is not apparent that this worked, although the low
proportions of students in years one and two in 2007
reporting bribes to pass an examination are encouraging.
A study in the USA concluded that college students can
play only a limited role in detecting teaching misconduct,
and proposed strengthening of institutional codes of con-
duct and faculty peer sanctions [30]. Braxton and Bayer
have argued for a formal code of ethics for undergraduate
teaching [31]. Students’ focus groups in our study sug-
gested disclosure, administrative penalties or dismissal for
teachers involved in teaching malpractice. In another
study, penalties for students for copying during examina-
tions, including dismissal from the course, have been sug-
gested [8]. However, given the disincentives for either
party in corrupt transactions to report the event, it is likely
that few cases will be detected, so the approach of the
Autonomous University of Guerrero of changing the sys-
tem of enrolment and examinations in order to avoid
bribes, rather than to focus on punishment, seems
appropriate.
Conclusions
Some positives changes occurred in the medical school
between the two surveys. The climate of political conflict
improved, school facilities improved and student over-
crowding was reduced. Student identification of their
own low performance as a main academic problem in
2007 suggests that they became more self-critical. Still,
student perceptions of corruption in the university
remained high and weaknesses in the management of
student services will require further improvement.
Medical schools need to build, in a deliberate way, an
institutional culture of integrity. Even with scarce finan-
cial resources, the medical school in our study has made
a commitment to reduce dishonest behaviour in the
faculty. It appears that a more intensive and broader
campaign is needed, involving university workers unions,
the school’s academic council and students associations.
Complete integrity in the medical school may take some
years to achieve. Additional efforts are needed to reduce
unethical behaviour of some teachers, specifically accept-
ing bribes for passing an examination.
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